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I. INTRODUCTION
"One of the most significant developments of the twentieth century"'
was the advent of the mass-produced automobile.2 Among its many con-
sequences was a profound increase in the mobility of society.3 With this
increased mobility came the increased risk of injury or death on our
highways. Our highways were overwhelmed with unsafe drivers, many
of whom were uninsured. This financial irresponsibility on the part of
drivers was attacked by various state legislatures. 4 The legislatures en-
* ©1990, Gary D. Plunkett. All rights reserved.
** B.S., Siena College (1986); J.D., University of Dayton School of Law (1990);
associated with Hochman & Roach Co., L.P.A., Dayton, Ohio.
I R. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 641 (1987). Indeed, the most im-
portant event in the history of insurance law was the advent of the mass-produced
automobile.
2 Id.; 1 A. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE pt. 3,
at 3 (2d ed. 1987).
a R. JERRY, supra note 1, at 641; 1 A. WIDISS, supra note 2, at 3.
4 R. JERRY, supra note 1, at 641-58; 1 A. WIDISS, supra note 2, at 3-19; Schwartz,
A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist Plans, 48 OHIO
ST. L. J. 419, 421-22 (1987); Ciano, Underinsured Motorist Coverage, Company
Insolvency, and the Ohio Insurance Guaranty Association Act, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
65, 65-67 (1972); Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw.
U.L. REV. 497, 497-500 (1967); Comment, Ohio's Uninsured Motorist Coverage
- Should the Legislature Re-examine the Statute?, 15 CAP. U.L. REV. 325, 326
(1986); Comment, The Effect of Other Insurance Clauses in Cases of Concurrent
Coverage of Uninsured Motorist Insurance, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 582, 582-83 (1968);
Comment, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 12 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 66, 66-67 (1963);
Comment, Redefining Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Ohio, 44 OHIO ST. L.
REV. 771, 771-72 (1983).
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acted compulsory insurance laws, financial responsibility laws, and laws
creating unsatisfied judgment funds.5 In an effort to forestall the enact-
ment of further legislation, the insurance industry began to market un-
insured motorist (UM) coverage in the mid-1950's.6 Soon thereafter, the
legislatures enacted statutes requiring mandatory UM coverage. 7 Be-
cause of the inadequacies of UM coverage, however, underinsured mo-
torist coverage (UDM) developed in response.8 The basic objective of
uninsured and underinsured motorist (UUM) coverage was to provide
compensation that would otherwise be unavailable to the victims of fi-
nancially irresponsible motorists.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Wood v. Shepard9 had occasion to interpret
Ohio's wrongful death statute10 in conjunction with Ohio's UUM statute.1
r R. JERRY, supra note 1, at 641-58; 1 A. WIDISS, supra note 2, at 3-19; Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 421-22; Ciano, supra note 4, at 65-67; Widiss, supra note 4, at
497-500; Comment, Ohio's Uninsured Motorist Coverage, supra note 4, at 326;
Comment, Concurrent Coverage of Uninsured Motorist Insurance, supra note 4,
at 66-67; Comment, Redefining Underinsured Motorist Coverage, supra note 4,
at 771-72.
6 1 A. WIDIss, supra note 2, pt. 1, at 12; R. JERRY, supra note 1, at 644; Plevin,
Set-off Under Uninsured Motorist's Coverage, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 10 (1971);
Comment, Arbitration, Statute of Limitations, and Uninsured Motorist Endorse-
ments, CLEV. ST. L. REV. 528 (1970).
71 A. Wmiss, supra note 2, pt. 1, at 13-14.
8 2 A. Wmiss, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 6.
9 38 Ohio. St. 3d 86, 526 N.E.2d 1089 (1988).
10 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01-03 (Page 1983). OIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2125.01 provides:
When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default
which would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and
recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been
liable if death had not ensued ... shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured.
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(A)(1) provides:
An action for wrongful death shall be brought in the name of the personal
representative of the decedent for the exclusive benefit of the surviving
spouse, the children, and the parents of the decedent, all of whom are
rebuttably presumed to have suffered damages by reason of the wrongful
death, and for the exclusive benefit of the other next of kin of the decedent.
1, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page 1982). This section states:
(A) No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance
insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily
injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery
in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this state unless both of the following are provided:
(1) Uninsured motorist coverage, which shall be in an amount of coverage
equivalent to the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage
and shall provide protection for bodily injury or death under provisions
approved by the superintendent of insurance for the protection of persons
insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness,
or disease, including death, resulting therefrom:
[Vol. 39:49
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The supreme court held that the wrongful death of an insured creates
separate claims that are not subject to a single person limit of liability
in the deceased insured's UUM coverage.1 2 Wood is a nebulous decision.
(2) Underinsured motorist coverage, which shall be in an amount of cov-
erage equivalent to the automobile liability; or motor vehicle liability cov-
erage and shall provide protection for an insured against loss for bodily
injury, sickness, or disease, including death, where the limits of coverage
available for payment to the insured under all bodily injury liability bonds
and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than
the limits for the insured's uninsured motorist coverage at the time of the
accident. The limits of liability for an insurer providing underinsured mo-
torist coverage shall be the limits of such coverage, less those amounts
actually recovered under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and
insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.
(B) Coverages offered under division (A) of this section shall be written
for the same limits of liability. No change shall be made in the limits of
one of these coverages without an equivalent change in the limits of the
other coverage.
(C) The named insured may only reject or accept both coverages offered
under division (A) of this section. The named insured may require the
issuance of such coverages for bodily injury or death in accordance with a
schedule of optional lesser amounts approved by the superintendent, that
shall be no less than the limits set forth in section 4509.20 of the Revised
Code for bodily injury or death. Unless the named insured requests such
coverages in writing, such coverages need not be provided in or supple-
mental to a renewal policy where the named insured has rejected the cov-
erages in connection with a policy previously issued to him by the same
insurer. If the named insured has selected uninsured motorist coverage in
connection with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer, such
coverages offered under division (A) of this section need not be provided in
excess of the limits of the liability previously issued for uninsured motorist
coverage, unless the named insured requests in writing higher limits of
liability for such coverages.
(D) For the purpose of this section, a motor vehicle is uninsured if the
liability insurer denies coverage or is or becomes the subject of insolvency
proceedings in any jurisdiction.
(E) In the event of payment to any person under the coverages required
by this section and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverages,
the insurer making such payment to the extent thereof is entitled to the
proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any
rights of recovery of such person against any person or organization legally
responsible for the bodily injury or death for which such payment is made,
including any amount recoverable from an insurer which is or becomes the
subject of insolvency proceedings, through such proceedings or in any other
lawful manner. No insurer shall attempt to recover any amount against
the insured of an insurer which is or becomes the subject of insolvency
proceedings, to the extent of his rights against such insurer which such
insured assigns to the paying insurer.
(F) The coverages required by this section shall not be made subject to
an exclusion or reduction in amount because of any workers' compensation
benefits payable as a result of the same injury or death.
(G) Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance
that includes coverage offered under division (A) of this section may include
terms and conditions that preclude stacking of such coverages.
(H) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the inclusion of underinsured
motorist coverage in any uninsured motorist coverage provided in compli-
ance with this section.
12 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 88, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 (1988).
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It overcompensates the deceased insured's surviving family members and
turns the deceased insured's UUM coverage into a bottomless well from
which the surviving family members may draw compensation. The full
effect of Wood is yet unknown. What is known, however, is that the state
of the law after Wood is a mess. This article discusses the propriety of
Wood.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On September 8, 1984, James Wood, his wife Gina, and their two minor
children, Jessica and Carrie, were traveling west in their truck on State
Route 49.13 At the same time, Craig Shepard was traveling north in his
car on Gordon-Landis Road.14 Failing to obey a stop sign at the intersec-
tion of State Route 49 and Gordon-Landis Road, Shepard collided his car
into the Woods' truck. 5 Gina Wood died from resulting injuries. 16 Injured
in the accident were James, Jessica, and Carrie Wood.
17
Shepard had an automobile insurance policy with State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company.'8 This policy provided liability coverage
with limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.' 9 James and
Gina Wood had an automobile insurance policy with The Professional
Insurance Company that provided UUM coverage with liability limits of
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident.20 Jessica and Carrie Wood
were covered under this policy.21
Thereafter, James Wood, individually and in his capacities as admin-
istrator of Gina Wood's estate and guardian of Jessica and Carrie Wood,
brought an action against Shepard and Professionals. 22 James Wood
sought damages from Shepard for the wrongful death of Gina Wood.
23
The Woods settled with Shepard. James Wood also sought a declaratory
judgment construing the Professionals policy regarding the underinsured
motorist coverage provision.24 James Wood sought a declaration that each
of the Woods be entitled to assert separate claims against the UDM cov-









10 Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St.3d 86, 88, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 (1988).
21 See, e.g., id.
22 Id.
- Id.
" Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St.3d 86, 88, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 (1988).
"1 Id. at 86-87, 526 N.E.2d at 1090.
[Vol. 39:49
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The trial court held that Ohio's wrongful death statute created only a
single cause of action, thus precluding the Woods from asserting separate
wrongful death claims under the UDM coverage. 26 The Montgomery
County Court of Appeals affirmed.2 7 But, because of a conflict at the
appellate level on whether Ohio's wrongful death statute created separate
claims, the court of appeals certified the record to the Ohio Supreme
Court.2 1
The Ohio Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, disagreed with
the trial court and the court of appeals. The supreme court held that
"[elach person entitled to recover damages ... for wrongful death, and
who is an insured under an underinsured motorist provision in an in-
surance policy, has a separate claim and such separate claims may not
be made subject to the single person limit of liability in the underinsured
motorist provision.
2
The supreme court reasoned that the language of the wrongful death
statute supports that the statute creates separate claims.3 0 The court
noticed that certain survivors of the decedent are rebuttably presumed
to have suffered damages.2 1 The court, therefore, reasoned that because
each survivor is presumed to have suffered damages, each must have a
separate claim.32 The court recognized, moreover, that the Ohio Unin-
sured and Underinsured Motorist statute required insurers to provide
insureds with recovery for wrongful death caused by uninsured or un-
derinsured motorists.33 The court found that the UUM statute did not
authorize insurers to limit claims for wrongful death to single person
limits of liability.34
James, Jessica, and Carrie Wood were all insureds undor the Profes-
sionals policy.3 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Professionals
could not limit the Woods' claims for wrongful death to the single person
limit of liability in the underinsured motorist coverage provision. As a
result, each claim had a maximum coverage of $100,000 up to a total
limitation of $300,000.36
26 Id. at 87, 526 N.E.2d at 1090.
27 Id.
28 Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 87, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1090 (1988). The
conflicting appellate court cases were Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No.
86-CA-2 (Delaware App. June 5, 1986) (LEXIS, States Library, Ohio file) (holding
that separate causes of action for wrongful death are not subject to an insurer's
single person limit of liability) and Dick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App.3d 28
(Hamilton Co. 1986), rev'd, 40 Ohio St. 3d 80 (1988) (holding that separate causes
of action for wrongful death are subject to an insurer's single person limit of
liability). After Wood was decided, the Ohio Supreme Court in Dick v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 40 Ohio St. 3d 80 (1988), reversed the Court of Appeals for Hamilton
County.
Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 91, 526 N.E.2d 1090, 1094 (1988).
30 Id. at 90, 526 N.E.2d at 1092.
31 [d.
31 Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 90, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (1988).
-
4Id.I1 d. at 91, 526 N.E.2d at 1093.
36 Id. at 90-91, 526 N.E.2d at 1093-94.
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Wrongful Death in Ohio
Civil recovery for wrongful death has greatly developed since Lord
Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton" declared that "the death of a human
being could not be complained of as an injury. '3 At common law, an
action for wrongful death did not exist.3 9 Statutes created the right to sue
for the death of a human being. Consequently, a wrongful death action
is widely regarded as a "creature of statute.
40
Before 1851, there was no cause of action for wrongful death in Ohio.
41
In 1851, however, the Ohio General Assembly enacted its first wrongful
death statute.42 It was modeled after England's Fatal Accidents Act of
1846, commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act.43 Similar to most juris-
dictions, the proper plaintiff in an Ohio wrongful death action is the
1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808).
3 Id. See also Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q.
REV. 431 (1916).
19 J. McCormac, Wrongful Death in Ohio 1 (1982).
See id.
41 Sabol v. Pekoc, 148 Ohio St. 545, 549, 76 N.E.2d 84, 87 (1947); J. McCORMAC,
supra note 39, at 1. See Ross, Recovery of Punitive Damages in Ohio Wrongful
Death Actions: A Preferred Approach, 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 175, 178 (1981);
Comment, Ohio's New Wrongful Death Statute: An Expanded Scope of Recoverable
Damages, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1088 (1984) [hereinafter Wrongful Death].
42 Ohio's first wrongful death statute reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Damages recoverable for causing death. Be it enacted, etc., That
whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default; and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not
ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages, in respect thereof; then, and in every such case, the person who,
or the corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the
person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or second degree, or
manslaughter.
Sec. 2. Action brought by personal representative. Every such action shall
be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of such de-
ceased persons; and the amount recovered in every such action, shall be for
the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased person,
and shall be distributed to such widow and next of kin in the proportions
provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal estates, left by
persons dying intestate; and in every such action, the jury may give such
damages as they shall deem fair and just, not exceeding five thousand
dollars, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death
to the wife and next of kin to such deceased person; Provided, that every
such action shall be commenced within two years after the death of such
deceased person.
REVISED STATUTES OP OFno, 2 CURWEN 1673, 49 LAWS 117, ch. 1105 (1851).
J. MCCORMAC, supra note 39, at 1; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984).
[Vol. 39:49
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personal representative of the decedent. 44 Only the personal represen-
tative may bring a wrongful death action.45 The action is maintained for
the exclusive benefit of the decedent's surviving spouse, children, parents,
and other next of kin.46 "[A] prerequisite of recovery for wrongful death
is that there be in existence a beneficiary for whom the exclusive right
is to be maintained."47 If there are no beneficiaries, there is no right to
maintain a wrongful death action.4 Historically, the underlying policy
of a wrongful death action is that the decedent's surviving family mem-
bers should be compensated for the loss of support that would have been
received but for the decedent's death. 49 Thus, in some jurisdictions, re-
covery for wrongful death is limited to pecuniary loss resulting from the
decedent's death.0 Recent amendments to Ohio's wrongful death statute
have expanded the scope of recoverable damages well beyond pecuniary
loss. 5'
Interpreting wrongful death statutes has been a formidable task for
the courts. A well-known maxim of statutory construction is that statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. 52 Wrongful
death statutes are in derogation of the common law because, at common
law, wrongful death was not actionable.53 Nonetheless, three views re-
garding the interpretation of wrongful death statutes have emerged.
5 4
Some authorities hold that death statutes, being in derogation of the
common law, are to be strictly construed.5 5 Other authorities, viewing
death statutes as remedial, hold that a liberal construction is appropri-
ate.5 6 Finally, a third view contends that death statutes are to be strictly
44 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Page 1987).45 Id.
'BId.; J. McCoRMAC, supra note 39, at 11.
47 J. McCORMAC, supra note 39, at 11.
46 See id.
49 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43, § 127, at 949.
5old.
11 1. Comment, Wrongful Death, supra note 41, at 1099. The compensatory
damages that may be awarded in an Ohio wrongful death action are as follows:
(1) Loss of support from the reasonably expected earning capacity of the
decedent:
(2) Loss of services of the decedent:
(3) Loss of the society of the decedent, including loss of companionship,
consortium, care, assistance, attention, protection, advice, guidance, coun-
sel, instruction, training, an education, suffered by the surviving spouse,
minor children, parents, or next of kin:
(4) Loss of prospective inheritance to the decedent's heirs at law at the
time of his death:
(5) The mental anguish incurred by the surviving spouse, minor children,
parents, or next of kin.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(B) (Page 1987).
12 STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFrING 129 (2d ed. 1984).
- Sabol v. Pekoc, 148 Ohio St. 545, 551-52, 76 N.E.2d 84, 95 (1947).
-" See 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 13 (1988); 30 0. JUR. 3D Death § 36-39 (1981).
11 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 13 (1988).
56 Id.
1991]
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construed when one determines the persons or classes of persons who are
entitled to recover, but liberally construed when one applies the statute
to those persons or classes.67
Long ago, the Ohio Supreme Court in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St.
Louis R.R. v. Hine58 stated that Ohio's wrongful death statute created
new rights in derogation of the common law and, therefore, must be
strictly construed. 9 Here the supreme court acknowledged that Ohio'sdeath statute was not remedial.6 Then in Mahoning Valley R.R. v. VanAlstine,61 the Ohio Supreme Court appeared to depart from Hine. The
court in Van Alstine recognized that Ohio's death statute should be
strictly construed, but that the policy and purpose of the statute should
not be ignored either.62 Years later in Sabol v. Pekoc,63 the supreme court
again stated that Ohio's wrongful death statute, being in derogation of
the common law, "must be applied strictly in accord with all its essential
terms."4 As an example, the Sabol court noted:
[Ilf the beneficiaries and not the representative were to bring
an action for wrongful death, such an action would not lie
because the beneficiaries have no common-law right by statute.
Unless a petition for wrongful death is filed strictly according
to the essential terms of the wrongful-death act, such petition
does not state a good cause of action because the act is the sole
source of the right upon which the petition is based. 65
But when a dispute arose concerning the substitution of the decedent's
personal representative after the lapse of the limitations period, the su-preme court in Kyes v. Pennsylvania R.R.6 6 specified that the death statute
was procedural and remedial and should be liberally construed.67 The
court in Kyes held the substitution was not error, because the personal
representative in a wrongful death action is a mere nominal party.68
57 Id.
5 25 Ohio St. 629 (1874).
1d. at 634.6DId.
6, 77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N.E. 601 (1908).61 d. at 411, 83 N.E. at 88.
6 148 Ohio St. 545, 76 N.E.2d 84 (1947).
Id. at 552, 76 N.E.2d at 88.
65 Id,
66 158 Ohio St. 362, 109 N.E.2d 503 (1952).
67 Id. at 365, 109 N.E.2d at 505.Id. A well-known author on wrongful death has explained inconsistencies
in interpreting Ohio's death act:
There are numerous principles of statutory construction that may be
argued in any given case, some of which may support one interpretation
and others which may support an opposite construction. Previously, oneprovision of the Wrongful Death Act has been applied strictly based uponthe recognized rule that a statute in derogation of common law must be so
applied, while, in another case, the Wrongful Death Act was referred to asprocedural and remedial in its nature and to be construed liberally. Al-though on the surface there appears to be an inconsistency in these two
[Vol. 39:49
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B. UUM Coverage in Ohio
Ohio's uninsured and underinsured motorist statute provides for the
mandatory offering of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for
bodily injury.69 The purpose of UUM coverage for bodily injury is to com-
pensate the injured insured as he would have been had the tortfeasor
possessed liability insurance or adequate liability insurance.70 UUM cov-
erage is a form of first-party insurance." It shifts the loss from the tort-
feasor to the injured party's insurer. The insured protects himself against
the financial irresponsibility of the tortfeasor by purchasing UUM cov-
erage for bodily injury. UUM coverage for bodily injury is truly of a
personal nature.7 2
The UUM statute also provides for the mandatory offering of UUM
coverage for wrongful death.72 But the purpose of UUM coverage for
wrongful death is to compensate the surviving family members of the
deceased insured, not the deceased insured himself.14 For it is the sur-
viving family members who would have been compensated had the tort-
feasor possessed liability insurance. 75 To be compensated pursuant to his
UUM coverage, the insured must be legally entitled to recover damages
from the tortfeasor.76 The tortfeasor must be at fault. 77 Regardless of fault,
however, a deceased insured is not legally entitled to recover damages
for his own wrongful death. 78 He is dead. Nor can the estate of a deceased
holdings, the inconsistency is not irreconcilable. The provision of the wrong-
ful death statute which was strictly construed applied to the right itself,
whereas the provision which was construed liberally concerned the proce-
dural requirement that the plaintiff be the personal representative and
whether that term-was broad enough to include an ancillary administratrix.
Thus, the issue of whether to apply strict or liberal construction to R.C.
Chapter 2125 probably is, at least in part, dependent upon what aspect of
the Wrongful Death Act is being considered. Even if the rule of strict con-
struction is to be applied, the policy and purpose of the statute cannot be
ignored in determining the intent of the general assembly.
J. MCCORMAC, supra note 39, at 5.
'9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Anderson 1988).70 R. JERRY, supra note 1, at 651; K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 144 (1986).
71 Widiss, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Observations on Litigating Over When
a Claimant is "Legally Entitled to Recover", 68 IowA L. REV. 397, 398-99 (1983).72 Id.
73 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Anderson 1988).
71 Id. Of course the surviving family members are to be compensated as they
would have been had the tortfeasor possessed liability insurance.
75 Id.
16 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Anderson 1988); Widiss, supra note 71, at
408-09.
77 Widiss, supra note 71, at 408-09.
78 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(A)(1) (Anderson 1988). The Ohio Supreme
Court in Sumwalt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 Ohio St. 3d 294, 466 N.E.2d 544 (1984),
stated: "The phrase 'legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured auto,' contained in the uninsured motorist provision of an automobile
insurance policy, means that the insured must be able to prove the elements of
her claim necessary to recover damages." Id. at 295, 466 N.E.2d at 544. Because
a deceased insured is dead, he cannot prove the elements of any claim.
1991]
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insured recover damages for his wrongful death.7 9 In Ohio, unlike some
states,80 a wrongful death action is not maintained for the benefit of the
decedent or his estate."' Rather, the action is maintained for the benefit
of the decedent's surviving family members.8 2 And only the decendent's
surviving family members may recover for the decedent's wrongful
death.8 In short, an insured cannot recover under his UUM coverage for
his own wrongful death. Thus, by purchasing UUM coverage for wrongful
death, the insured protects his surviving family members from the fi-
nancial irresponsibility of the tortfeasor.
The only time an insured can recover for wrongful death under his own
UUM coverage is when the insured is recovering damages for the wrong-
ful death of another who has been killed by an uninsured or underinsured
motorist.84 The person who has been wrongfully killed, however, does not
have to be an insured under the UUM coverage.8 5 Sexton v. State Farm
Mutual Automotive Insurance Co. 86 illustrates this point.
In Sexton, Gareld Sexton's daughter, Laurie, died as a result of an
automobile accident caused by an uninsured motorist. 7 Laurie was not
an insured under her father's policy with State Farm and she did not live
with him.H The State Farm policy provided uninsured motorist cover-
age.8 9 Subsequently, Gareld Sexton submitted a claim under his UM cov-
erage to recover his damages that resulted from the negligence of the
uninsured motorist.90 Because Laurie was not an insured, and the father
was not personally injured, State Farm denied coverage. 91 The Ohio Su-
preme Court, however, held that Sexton was entitled to recover.9 2 The
supreme court read Ohio's then existing UUM statute as requiring in-
surers to provide coverage to insureds who are legally entitled to recover
damages because of death caused by an uninsured motorist. 93 Sexton was
entitled to recover damages for Laurie's wrongful death and an uninsured
motorist had caused it.4 The court recognized that the UUM statute did
71 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Anderson 1988).
so 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 116-26 (2d ed. 1975).
81 Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Anderson 1988).82 /d.
83 Id.
"I Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 431, 433 N.E.2d
555 (1982).
85 Id. at 434-37, 433 N.E.2d at 558-60.
8 69 Ohio St. 2d 431, 433 N.E.2d 555 (1982).
7 Id. at 431, 433 N.E.2d at 557.





92 Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 431,435,433 N.E.2d
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not specify that the insured must be personally injured.95 State Farm's
policy, limiting recovery to those insureds personally injured, was thus
contrary to the UUM statute.9 6 The Ohio Supreme Court stated:
Thus, we have previously concluded that the purpose of the
statute is to protect the insured from losses and provide for
recovery of damages, which is consistent with our interpreta-
tion of the statute in the instant case. Other statements con-
cerning the injured are not determinative because in the
previous cases the insured and injured were the same person.
None of these cases considered the circumstances at issue -
whether uninsured motorist coverage permits recovery when
an insured's damages result from injuries or death of another
person .97
Justices Holmes, Locher, and Krupansky dissented. 98 Justice Holmes
found that the policy did not unreasonably limit Sexton's UM coverage.99
He believed that the majority was judicially extending coverage to include
family members who live in places far distant from the named insured.'00
"The risk area intended to be covered by the policy is the family unit
living in the same household."10 1
Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, moreover, compen-
sates insureds only 1 2 and, as already noted, only surviving family mem-
bers may recover for the wrongful death of the deceased relative.10 3 To
be compensated pursuant to the decedent's UUM coverage for the dece-
dent's wrongful death, the surviving family members of the decedent must
be insureds under the decedent's UUM coverage.'0 4 Theoretically, then,
an insurer cannot provide UUM coverage for the wrongful death of an
insured if that insured is the only insured in the policy. In one sense, the
UUM statute seems to require that when an insurer offers an insured
UUM coverage for wrongful death, the insurer must offer to insure all
surviving family members of the insured. But this reading of the UUM
91 Id. at 434, 433 N.E.2d at 558-59.
9 Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 431, 437, 433 N.E.2d
555, 560 (1982).
9, Id. at 436, 433 N.E.2d at 559-60.
91 Id. at 437, 433 N.E.2d at 560.
Id. at 438, 433 N.E.2d at 561.
100 Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 431,438, 433 N.E.2d
555, 561 (1982).
10, Id.
102 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Anderson 1988). UM coverage protects
"persons insured thereunder." Id. at § 3937.18(A)(1). UDM coverage provides
"protection for an insured." Id. at § 3937.18(A)(2).
'0" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Anderson 1988).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Anderson 1988). The Ohio Supreme Court
in Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 91, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1093 (1988), stated
that "[o]nly an insured under the underinsured motorist provision can recover
under the policy for injury or wrongful death." This, of course, also applies to UM
coverage.
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statute seems improbable. It is doubtful that the General Assembly in-
tended to force an insurer to contract with all surviving family members
of an insured.105 No Ohio law expressly requires an insurer to insure all
surviving family members of an insured. 10 6 For the most part, an auto-
mobile insurance carrier has absolute discretion in deciding whom it
wishes to insure.10 7 Given that the decedent's personal representative is
the only person who may bring a wrongful death action, a more plausible
reading of the UUM statute would require the insurer to insure the
deceased insured's personal representative and, upon the decedent's
wrongful death, to pay the personal representative all sums which the
representative is entitled to recover on behalf of the decedent's surviving
family members. Consequently, the insurer could compensate all surviv-
ing family members for the decedent's wrongful death without contracting
with all survivors directly.
C. Precursors to Wood
Ohio's uninsured and underinsured motorist statute has always seem-
ingly confused Ohio courts. In this regard, the courts may not have been
entirely at fault. The UUM statute is not the most artfully drafted statute.
The language of the statute is confusing. The Ohio Supreme Court has
not, however, ameliorated the confusion. In fact, its decisions have served
to increase the confusion. Wood is not the first Ohio Supreme Court de-
cision to cause uncertainty about the proper interpretation of the UUM
statute. Rather, Wood is the latest in a long line of controversial decisions.
Three key Ohio Supreme Court decisions are examined.
In Auto-Owners Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lewis,1'8 the appellant's minor
son was injured in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. 09
The appellant's son was covered under a policy issued to the appellant
by the appellee Auto-Owners Mutual Insurance Company. 10 The policy
provided uninsured motorist coverage."' The appellant sued the unin-
sured motorist's estate and asserted a claim for personal injuries on behalf
of his son and an individual claim for the loss of his son's services.1 2 The
"I Compare with 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 94, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1096 (1988). Justice
Holmes stated: "The conclusions of the majority are directly contrary to the clear
language of the agreement, and the majority's position advocates that this court
reject not only the terms of the policy, but also minimize the ability of the parties
to enter into contractual arrangements."
10I See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.01-99 (Anderson 1988). See also
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3901-1-01-3901-2-15 (1988).
107 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
108 10 Ohio St. 3d 156, 462 N.E.2d 396 (1984).109 Id. at 156, 462 N.E.2d at 396.
110 Id. at 161, 462 N.E.2d at 400.
11Id.
1" Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 10 Ohio St. 3d 156, 161, 462 N.E.2d
396, 400 (1984). See Grindell v. Huber, 28 Ohio St. 2d 71, 275 N.E.2d 614 (1971)(holding that when a minor child is injured by a tortfeasor a derivative action is
created in favor of the minor child's parents); Whitehead v. General Telephone
Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969) (same).
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appellee disputed the extent of coverage and brought a declaratory judg-
ment action.113 At the declaratory judgment action, the trial court found
that the maximum amount of UM coverage applied separately to each
claim. 1 4 In effect, the trial court allowed appellant to double the amount
of UM coverage. 115 The court of appeals reversed."
6
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the trial court. 117 The supreme
court, finding support in Sexton, held that "where separate and inde-
pendent causes of action arise from injuries caused by an uninsured mo-
torist and such injuries are covered by the uninsured motorist provision
of an automobile insurance policy, the policy limits applicable to unin-
sured motorist coverage will be available to each cause of action."'
In Auto-Owners, the supreme court erroneously relied on Sexton. Sexton
concerned wrongful death; Auto-Owners did not. This basic distinction
was never acknowledged. The supreme court in Auto-Owners feared that
the appellant could receive less coverage than he paid for, if the UM
coverage was not available to each of the appellant's claims."' The result,
however, was that the appellant received more coverage than he ever
could have imagined.120 The reasoning in Auto-Owners was simply in-
adequate and unpersuasive.
Almost two years later in 1986, the Ohio Supreme Court decided In re
Estate of Reeck,"'2 a case of first impression. The issue presented was
"whether a settlement recovered pursuant to the uninsured motorist pro-
vision of an insurance policy is to be considered the proceeds of an in-
surance contract payable to the deceased insured's estate or as damages
distributable under the Wrongful Death Act."'122 In Reeck, Donald L. Reeck
was killed by an uninsured motorist. 23 Reeck was survived by his wife,
Mrs. Reeck, and by his daughter, Mrs. Hill.124 At the time of his death,
Reeck had an insurance policy providing UM coverage.' 25 Mrs. Hill was
an insured under her father's policy.1 26 Mrs. Reeck, the executrix of
Reeck's estate, settled the insurance claim under Reeck's UM coverage."
27




"I Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 10 Ohio St. 3d 156, 160, 462 N.E.2d
396, 400 (1984).
118 Id. at 156, 462 N.E.2d at 397.
119 Id. at 161, 462 N.E.2d at 401.
120 Id.
121 21 Ohio St. 3d 126, 488 N.E.2d 195 (1986).
122 Id. at 127-28, 488 N.E.2d at 197.
123 Id. at 126, 488 N.E.2d at 196.
24 Id.
12, In re Estate of Reeck, 21 Ohio St. 3d 126, 127, 488 N.E.2d 195, 196 (1986).
126 Id. at 129.
127 Id. at 126, 488 N.E.2d at 195.
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The trial court allowed all settlement proceeds to be distributed by the
terms of Reeck's will, not by Ohio's wrongful death statute. 128 Because
the proceeds were to be distributed pursuant to the decedent's will, and
Mrs. Hill was not mentioned in the will, she was precluded from sharing
in the proceeds. The court of appeals affirmed. 2 9
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and the trial
court.13 0 The supreme court held that the settlement proceeds were to be
distributed among those entitled to recover for the decedent's wrongful
death. 13' By so holding, the court found that Mrs. Hill could share in the
proceeds. 3 2
Four years after Auto-Owners, in Dues v. Hodge,133 the Ohio Supreme
Court overruled its holding in Auto-Owners. 3 4 In Dues, Jay Dues, a minor,
was injured by an uninsured motorist. 3 5 The parents of Jay, on his behalf
and on their own behalf, and Jay's brother, Randy, sued the uninsured
motorist. 3 6 The Dueses further sought a declaratory judgment against
their insurer, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, to determine the
amount of uninsured motorist coverage available at the time of the ac-
cident. 37 Jay was not insured, but his parents and brother were. 138 State
Farm had three automobile insurance policies in effect that had been
issued to Robert Dues. 13 9 Each policy contained UM coverage, and each
policy contained liability limits of $100,000 for all damages due to bodily
injury to one person and $300,000 for all damages due to bodily injury
to all parties. 40 State Farm also had in effect an automobile policy issued
to Jay's brother, Randy Dues.' 4 ' This policy contained UM coverage lim-
ited to $25,000 for all damages due to bodily injury to one person and
$50,000 for all damages due to bodily injury to all parties. 142 The case
was bifurcated and the declaratory judgment action was submitted to a
referee. 4
3
2 1d. at 126-27.
11 In re Estate of Reeck, 21 Ohio St. 3d 126, 127, 488 N.E.2d 195, 196 (1986).
130 Id. at 129, 488 N.E.2d at 198.
131 Id.
12Id.
"1 36 Ohio St. 3d 46, 521 N.E.2d 789 (1988).
1M Id. at 49, 521 N.E.2d at 793.
i3 ld. at 46, 521 N.E.2d at 790.
136 Id.
137 Dues v. Hodge, 36 Ohio St. 3d 46, 47, 521 N.E.2d 789, 790 (1988).
I's Id. at 46, 521 N.E.2d at 791.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Dues v. Hodge, 36 Ohio St. 3d 46, 47, 521 N.E.2d 789, 791 (1988).
142Id. at 46-47, 521 N.E.2d at 791.
143 Id. at 47, 521 N.E.2d at 791.
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The Dueses attempted to "stack" the UM coverages in each policy.144
They claimed they were entitled to a recovery of $100,000 for Jay Dues
under the UM provision of each policy issued to Robert Dues.1 45 The
Dueses claimed each parent had derivative actions based on Jay's injuries
and that each parent was entitled to recover $100,000 under each policy
issued to Robert Dues. 146 They further sought an additional $50,000 under
Randy Dues' policy.
47
The referee determined that the policies contained valid anti-stacking
provisions. 14 Thus, the Dueses were entitled only to $100,000 of total
coverage for the direct and derivative actions. 49 The trial court agreed
with the referee about the validity of the anti-stacking provisions. 5 0 The
trial court found that Jay Dues was entitled only to $100,000 of coverage,
but found that Jay's parents were entitled to an additional $100,000 of
coverage because of their derivative actions.'5 ' The Dueses were thus
entitled to a maximum of $200,000 of UM coverage. 152
The court of appeals upheld the anti-stacking rulings. 5 3 The court of
appeals, however, found available an action for liability by Jay, a deriv-
ative action by the parents, and a derivative action by the brother. 54 The
court of appeals found that the Dueses were entitled to $100,000 of UM
coverage for each separate action under four insurance policies. 155
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. 156 The
first issue before the court was whether the anti-stacking provisions were
valid. 157 The court ruled that they were and found that the referee was
correct in forbidding the stacking of UM coverage. 18 The second issue
presented was whether the language in the insurance contract allowed
I4 /d.
Stacking is a term that refers to obtaining for a single loss insurance
proceeds from duplicate coverages. If an insured is allowed to stack cov-
erages, the insured is allowed to recover for damages received a sum up to
the stated limit of each policy that provides coverage. Under the principle
of indemnity, an insured is allowed to recover from insurance no more than
his loss. However, the policy limits of available insurance coverages often
are less than the injuries suffered by an insured or a victim of the insured's
conduct. If more policies can be reached for coverage, it is more likely that
the victim will receive compensation for his injuries.
R. JERRY, supra note 1, at 678.








153 Dues v. Hodge, 36 Ohio St. 3d 46, 47, 521 N.E.2d 789, 791 (1988).
354M.
155 Id.
1 Id. at 49, 521 N.E.2d at 793.
15 Dues v. Hodge, 36 Ohio St. 3d 46, 47, 521 N.E.2d 789, 791 (1988).
"8 Id. at 47-48, 521 N.E.2d at 791-92.
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separate UM coverage for derivative actions. 159 The policy made clear
that State Farm provided a maximum of $100,000 UM coverage for each
accident involving bodily injury to one person. 160 The court reasoned that
a derivative action stems from a single accident.1 61 "Indeed, the derivative
action would not exist but for the primary action."'162 The State Farm
policies limited coverage to $100,000 for all actions arising from a single
accident involving bodily injury to one person. 163
The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that Auto-Owners was erro-
neously based on Sexton.'6 The court overruled paragraph two of the
Auto-Owners syllabus and held that "[a]n insurance policy provision that
limits recovery for all causes of action arising out of bodily injury to one
person to a single limit of liability is a valid restriction of uninsured
motorist coverage. ' 16
The Wood court did not overrule Dues, but distinguished it.166 According
to Wood, "[t]he distinction is that Dues concerned bodily injury while this
case concerns wrongful death, for which each survivor is statutorily af-
forded a separate claim for damages."1 67 Therefore, each beneficiary of an
insured decedent will have a separate claim under the UUM coverage -
immune from an insurer's single person limit of liability. 68 Conversely,
an insurer's attempt to limit derivative claims in bodily injury actions
will prevail.1
69
Justice Holmes, concurring in part and dissenting in part, reasoned
that a wrongful death action creates only one cause of action.17 0 He vig-
119 Id. at 48, 521 N.E.2d at 792.
160 Id
"I Dues v. Hodge, 36 Ohio St. 3d 46, 48, 521 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1988).
162 Id.
163 Id.
14 Id. at 49, 521 N.E.2d at 793.
165 Dues v. Hodge, 36 Ohio St. 3d 46, 49, 521 N.E.2d 789, 793 (1988).
166 Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 91, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1093-94 (1988).
.6 Id. at 91, 526 N.E.2d at 1093.
I" Id. at 91, 526 N.E.2d at 1094.
169 Dues v. Hodge, 36 Ohio St. 3d 46, 49, 521 N.E.2d 789, 793 (1988).
170 Wood, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 95, 526 N.E.2d at 1097 (Holmes, J., concurring and
dissenting in part). Justice Holmes' proposed syllabus reads:
1. Where a wrongful death is asserted and an action is brought pursuant
to Ohio's wrongful death statute, R.C. 2125.02, although a surviving spouse,
the children, the parents, and the next of kin of the decedent may be entitled
to receive damages as proportioned among them by the jury, or the court,
there is only one cause of action for the recovery of these damages flowing
from the death of the decedent.
2. An automobile insurance policy provision that limits recovery under
the policy, for all damages due to bodily injury, including death from such
injuries of one person to a single limit of liability, is a valid restriction of
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage and does not violate R.C.
3937.18.
3. Accordingly, in a claim for wrongful death under a policy of automobile
insurance providing underinsured motorist coverage, the per-person limi-
tation of liability applies to all damages sought by the personal represen-
tative of the decedent, regardless of the number of statutory beneficiaries
who are also covered persons under the policy.
Id. at 92, 526 N.E.2d at 1094 (emphasis in original).
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orously dissented with the majority's interpretation of Dues.17' Justice
Holmes refused to read Dues as applying only to causes of action for
bodily injury. 72 To hold otherwise, stated Justice Holmes, is "not ... based
upon any reasonable interpretation of the verbiage of that opinion.' 1 73
Moreover, he felt that the majority's position thwarted the ability of
insurers to contract freely. 74 Justice Holmes concluded that the majority's
position was in direct opposition to the majority view of other states on
the issue.
1 75
D. Decisions From Other Jurisdictions
Of the few instances in which other courts have considered the wrongful
death issue presented in Wood, these courts have summarily rejected an
insured's attempt to assert separate claims under an insurance policy
limiting liability to a single person.176 The Florida case of Mackoul v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York 177 is a good example.
In Mackoul, the appellant was the father and personal representative
of a child who died as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile
accident.17 8 The appellant's insurance policy contained uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage with liability limits of $100,000 for bodily
injuries sustained by any one person up to an aggregate amount of
$300,000 for all damages arising out of any one accident. 79 The appellant
argued that under the wrongful death statute a separate cause of action
was created in favor of the child's father, mother, and estate.'8 ' Further-
more, the appellant contended that each cause of action could be asserted
under the policy.''
171 Id. at 95, 526 N.E.2d at 1097.
172 Id.
173 Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 95 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1097 (1988).
174 Id. at 94, 526 N.E.2d at 1096.
175 Id.
176 See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eubanks, 785 F.2d 1346
(5th Cir. 1986); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Simmons, 642 F. Supp. 305 (N.D.
Cal. 1986); Mackoul v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 402 So. 2d 1259
(Fla. App. 1981); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Acosta, 479 So. 2d 1089 (Miss.
1985); Arnold v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 707 P.2d 161 (Wy.
1985); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Bisson, 122 N.H. 747, 449 A.2d 1226 (1982);
Thompson v. Grange Ins. Co., 34 Wash. App. 151, 660 P.2d 307 (1983); Vega v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 401 So. 2d 368 (La. App. 1981); Zoda v. Mutual
of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 34 Wash. App. 98, 684 P.2d 91 (1984).
17402 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. App. 1981).




," Mackoul v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 402 So.2d 1259, 1260 (Fla.
App. 1981).
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Without rejecting that separate claims may arise from a wrongful death
action, the court in Mackoul held that the policy clearly limited the
amount of recoverable damages by all parties for the bodily injury to one
person to $100,000.182 The court analyzed neither wrongful death nor
UUM coverage.183 In addition, the court drew no distinction between
bodily injury sustained by an insured and the wrongful death of an in-
sured. 1' Other than citing to remotely analogous cases, the Mackoul court
relied on the clear language in the policy. 18'
One District Court of Appeals of Florida in Florida Insurance Guaranty
Association v. Cope, 8 6 relying on Mackoul, held that the survivors of a
wrongful death action cannot assert separate claims under an uninsured
motorist provision limiting liability to losses sustained by any one per-
son."8 7 As did the Mackoul court, the Cope court did not reject that separate
claims arise from a wrongful death action.' Nonetheless, for the Florida
Court of Appeals, the Mackoul precedent was adequate justification to
reject the survivors' attempt to assert separate claims.189
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Missis-
sippi in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Eubanks'90 held
that each beneficiary entitled to recover under Mississippi's wrongful
death act could not assert separate claims under insurance policies lim-
iting liability coverage to bodily injuries sustained by one person.'91 Un-
like Mackoul, the court in Eubanks provided a reasonable rationale for
its holding: "To hold differently would result in the amount of liability
under a policy depending in large part on the number of statutory ben-
eficiaries an insured might have. An insured with a large family would
have more coverage than an insured with an identical policy but a small
family." 2
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling. 193 The court of appeals, however, based
its decision not on the district court's rationale but on State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Acosta,19 4 a case that did not concern wrongful




185Mackoul v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 402 So.2d 1259, 1260 (Fla.
App. 1981).
116405 So. 2d 292 (Fla. App. 1981).




,1o 620 F. Supp. 17 (D. Miss. 1985), af/d, 785 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1986).191 Id.
192 Id.
13 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eubanks, 785 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1986).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Separate Wrongful Death Claims
Wood v. Shepard196 begins from the premise that a wrongful death
action creates separate claims.19 7 The Ohio Supreme Court in Wood rea-
soned that this "conclusion. .. emanates from the language of the statute
itself."'198 In Wood, the court focused on particular statutory language
stating that the surviving spouse, children, and parents of the decedent
are rebuttably presumed to have suffered damages. 199 To the court, if one
suffers damages, one must have a claim.200 The supreme court in Wood,
however, did not limit its decision to those family members rebuttably
presumed to have suffered damages.201 The rebuttable presumption of the
wrongful death statute does not apply to the decedent's other next of
kin.202 The supreme court in Wood did not exclude other next of kin from
the scope of its decision.202 Thus, the court's focus on the death statute's
rebuttable presumption is of no significance.
The Ohio Supreme Court, moreover, never explained what it meant by
"separate claims. '20 4 Does the term "claim" mean "action"? May each
surviving family member now proceed with his own wrongful death action
separate from other family members?2 5 If so, the courts of Ohio will be
burdened with numerous, individual wrongful death actions filed by each
surviving family member.
The death statute mandates that "fain action for wrongful death shall
be brought in the name of the personal representative of the decedent for
the exclusive benefit of the surviving [family members] of the decedent. 2 6
The statute contemplates one action, brought by the decedent's personal
representative for the benefit of the decedent's surviving family members.
The statute efficiently combines the "claims" of the decedent's family
members into a single action. Of course, each family member of a wrong-
'9 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 526 N.E.2d 1089 (1988).
-' Id. at 88, 526 N.E.2d at 1091.
,91 Id. at 90, 526 N.E.2d at 1092.
199 Id.
2
- Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 90, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (1988).
2 Id. at 90-92, 526 N.E.2d at 1092-94.
212 J. MCCORMAC, supra note 39, at 14.
211 See supra note 202.
214 Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 88, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (1988).
205 One author has written:
[Wood] should not be extended beyond the space intended by the Supreme
court. The court noted that the action must be brought in the name of the
personal representative of the decedent; the court did not purport to allow
a beneficiary to proceed with his own action rather than as one of the
beneficiaries in a single action brought in the name of the personal rep-
resentative of the decedent.
J. MCCORMAC, supra note 39, at 2 (Supp. 1989).
SOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Anderson 1988) (emphasis added).
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fully killed decedent will ultimately receive the damages that the dece-
dent's personal representative recovers for them. And in a loose sense,
each surviving family member could be said to have a separate claim for
damages. It does not follow, however, that an insurer cannot subject those
claims to a single person limit of liability in its uninsured and under-
insured motorist coverage. A single person limit of liability treats a
wrongful death action as does the wrongful death statute itself: Each
surviving family member is combined into a legal unit; the death action
retains its singular nature. Under a single person limitation, though,
each survivor still receives his individual portion of the wrongful death
proceeds.
The supreme court in Wood was construing a statute, the UUM statute.
There is no mention in that statute that insurance companies cannot
subject surviving family members' claims to a single person limit of li-
ability. Likewise, there is no mention in the wrongful death statute that
insurance companies cannot subject surviving family members' claims to
a single person limit of liability.
A single person limit of liability is just one method of defining the
maximum coverage in an insurance policy. Other methods exist, but the
single person limitation is the most efficient. In sum, the Ohio Supreme
Court in deciding Wood misinterpreted the function of a single person
limit of liability and left the scope of its decision unknown.
B. Contrary to the Purpose of UUM Coverage
Wood is contrary to the purpose of uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage for wrongful death. In the context of wrongful death, the purpose
of UUM coverage is to compensate the deceased insured's surviving family
members as they would have been had the tortfeasor possessed liability
insurance. 20 7 If a tortfeasor possesses liability insurance, the single person
limit of liability in his policy would combine and limit the claims of all
surviving family members.20
8
Under Wood, the insurer and insured are confronted with an anomalous
situation. If an insured is severely injured by a negligent uninsured mo-
torist, the injured insured's insurer pays in accordance with the terms of
the single person limit of liability in the insured's policy. If that insured
dies several days later, however, the decedent's insurer pays not in ac-
cordance with the terms of the decedent's policy but in accordance with
how many surviving family members that insured left behind. Wood
leaves an insurer's liability limits to chance.
7 8ee supra notes 74-83 & accompanying text.
208 This statement assumes that Hill v. Allstate Insurance Co., 50 Ohio St. 3d
243, N.E.2d (1990) and Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., 46 Ohio St. 3d 84, 545 N.E.2d
83 (1989) are still good law in Ohio.
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C. Bypassing Wood
The Ohio Supreme Court in Wood held that the claims of each survivor
in a wrongful death action may not be combined and limited to the single
person limit of liability in the deceased insured's UUM coverage. 20 9 The
supreme court reasoned that the UUM statute does not grant authority
to limit claims for wrongful death to a single person limitation.210 The
insurance policy in Wood contained a single person limit of liability of
$100,000.211 But the supreme court held that the claims of James, Jessica,
and Carrie Wood were each entitled to a maximum coverage of $100,000
up to a total limitation of $300,000 for the wrongful death of Gina Wood,
as opposed to all three claims being combined and limited to a maximum
coverage of $100,000. 2 12
Assume that the holding in Wood is correct. A wrongful death action
does create separate claims, not subject to an insurer's single person limit
of liability in its UUM coverage. Nonetheless, an insurance company
could, in effect, bypass this holding by simply writing separate limits of
liability for the claims of each survivor in a wrongful death action. Each
claim would remain separate and distinct. The insurance company would
not be combining and limiting the claims of each survivor to a single
person limit of liability. In Wood, for example, the insurance company
could have separately limited the claims of each surviving family member
to $12,500 per person up to a total limitation of $25,000 per incident. 21
Thus, James, Jessica, and Carrie Wood could have received no more than
$25,000 for the wrongful death of Gina Wood. No Ohio law forbids this.214
In short, Wood may have been nothing more than form over substance.
It was contended in Wood "that the wrongful death statute ... could
be used, under Wood, to permit recovery by persons who are not in any
way contractually in privity with an underinsured carrier. '21'5 The Ohio
Supreme Court rejected this contention. The supreme court explained
that "[o]nly an insured under the underinsured motorist provision can
209 Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 88, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 (1988).
1o Id. at 90, 526 N.E.2d at 1092-93.
211 Id. at 86, 526 N.E.2d at 1089. This common policy clause reads as follows:
LIMIT OF LIABILITY
The Limit of Liability shown in the declarations for this coverage is our
maximum limit of liability for all damages resulting from any one accident.
This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:
1. Covered persons;
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations;
or
4. Vehicles involved in the accident.
Id. at 88 n.2, 526 N.E.2d 1091 n.2.
M2 Id. at 90-91, 526 N.E.2d at 1093-94.
213 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.20(A) (Anderson 1988); see Inman v. Natl.
Union Fire Ins. Co., 49 Ohio App. 3d 122, 124 (1988).
214 See generally OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.01-99 (Anderson 1988); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE § 3901-1-01-3901-2-15 (1988).
215 Wood v. Shephard, 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 91, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1093 (1988).
1991]
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
recover under the policy for injury or wrongful death."21 6 The court thus
intimated that an insurer has complete discretion in deciding whom it
wishes to make an insured. Could an insurer insure only insureds who
have no chance of being wrongful death beneficiaries as to each other?
Similarly, in the context of insuring families, could an insurer issue sep-
arate policies to each family member, clearly naming only that family
member as an insured and excluding all others? In both situations, no
insured would be an insured under the wrongfully killed insured's un-
insured and underinsured motorist coverage. As a result, no insured could
collect under the deceased insured's UUM coverage for the deceased in-
sured's wrongful death.
Another question - though perhaps more plausible - asks whether
an insurer could insure only the named insured and his personal repre-
sentative in his UUM coverage? No one other than the named insured
and his personal representative would be insureds under the UUM cov-
erage. Here all surviving family members of the named insured would
be indirectly compensated for the named insured's wrongful death
through the named insured's personal representative. The surviving fam-
ily members, however, would have no right to collect directly under the
named insured's UUM coverage.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Wood does not resolve these
important questions. To what extent, if at all, an insurer may exclude an
insured's surviving family members remains a mystery.
D. Subsequent Cases
Since Wood, the Ohio Supreme Court has decided four cases addressing
the scope of Wood. The first case was Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Phil-
lips.217 In Phillips, Rosa Phillips was driving a motor vehicle owned by
her husband, Harry Phillips, Jr.218 Mrs. Phillips had her husband's per-
mission to drive the vehicle. 219 Mrs. Phillips negligently collided her ve-
hicle into the vehicle of David M. Thompson. 220 Mr. Thompson's wife,
Sharon Kay Thompson, was a passenger in her husband's vehicle. 221 As
a result of the collision, Mr. Thompson died and Mrs. Thompson sustained




217 44 Ohio St. 3d 163, 541 N.E.2d 1050, reh'g granted, 45 Ohio St. 3d 602, 544
N.E.2d 274 (1989).
218 Id. at 163, 541 N.E.2d at 1050.
219 Id.
=oId.
221 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 44 Ohio St. 3d 163, 163, 541 N.E.2d 1050,
1050-51, reh'g granted, 45 Ohio St. 3d 602, 544 N.E.2d 274 (1989).
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At the time of the accident, Cincinnati Insurance Company had in effect
a policy of liability insurance, insuring the Phillipses. 224 Sharon Kay
Thompson, individually and as administratrix of her husband's estate,
and Shannon Thompson sued the Phillipses.225 The first cause of action
claimed damages for the wrongful death of David Thompson. 226 The second
cause of action claimed damages for the personal injuries of Sharon Kay
Thompson.227 A third cause of action claimed damages for the conscious
pain and suffering of David Thompson. 22 8 And finally, a fourth cause of
action claimed damages for Shannon Thompson arising from the knowl-
edge of her father's death.
229
The Cincinnati Insurance Company filed an action, seeking a decla-
ration of its liability limits within its policy with the Phillipses. 230 The
trial court determined that Cincinnati was responsible for the maximum
possible liability of $300,000 for the accident. 2 1 The trial court found that
the full $100,000 liability limit for "each person" under the policy applied
separately for Mr. Thompson's survivorship claim, Mrs. Thompson's per-
sonal injury claim, and the wrongful death action. 232 The court of appeals
reversed. The court of appeals held that one set of "each person" limits
applied to all damages for bodily injury suffered by Mr. Thompson, in-
cluding the survivorship and wrongful death actions.
2 3
Thus, Cincinnati's maximum liability was limited to $200,000, or
$100,000 for each person involved in the accident.2 4 Finding its judgment
to be in conflict with other appellate decisions, the court of appeals cer-
tified the record of the case to the Ohio Supreme Court.
23
5
The only issue before the Ohio Supreme Court was whether the policy
language provided for separate maximum coverages of $100,000 each for
Mr. Thompson's survivorship claim and for the wrongful death action
filed by Mrs. Thompson.26 The supreme court, relying on Tomlinson v.
Skolnik,237 held the liability language of the Cincinnati policy applied
224 ld.
225 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 44 Ohio St. 3d 163, 163, 541 N.E.2d 1050,




229 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 44 Ohio St. 3d 163, 163, 541 N.E.2d 1050,




2 Id. at 163-64, 541 N.E.2d at 1051.
1 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 44 Ohio St. 3d 163, 163, 541 N.E.2d 1050,
1051, reh'g granted, 45 Ohio St. 3d 602, 544 N.E.2d 274 (1989).
1 Id. at 164, 541 N.E.2d at 1051.
'Id.
=
6 Id. at 164, 541 N.E.2d at 1052.
= 44 Ohio St. 3d 11, 540 N.E. 2d 716 (1989). In Tomlinson, Ronald Tomlinson
was injured in an automobile accident with a vehicle operated by Joe Skolnik.
Skolnik was insured by Buckeye Union Insurance Company. The Buckeye policy
provided coverage for bodily injury liability in the amount of $25,000 for each
person and aggregate bodily injury liability in the amount of $50,000 for each
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only to those persons who were in the accident. Mr. and Mrs. Thompson
were the only two actually in the accident. 23 The Thompsons argued that
the each person limitation in the policy should apply individually for the
survivorship claim and for the death action.2 39 The supreme court disa-
greed. Although a wrongful death action is distinct from a survivorship
action, the limit of liability in the Cincinnati policy is determined by the
number of persons injured in any one accident. 240 "Thus, if only two per-
sons sustain bodily injury in any one auto accident, as here, then only
two separate claims may be made against the policy, regardless of the
number of causes of action or type of damage which arose out of such
bodily injury. 241 This single person limit of liability was a valid restriction
of automobile liability insurance.
Justice Douglas vigorously dissented, stating that the majority's de-
cision was absurd. 242 According to Justice Douglas, "[tihe majority opin-
ion, in effect, allows the Thompsons' wrongful death claim to be combined,
under a single limit of liability, with other injuries suffered." 243 He would
extend Wood to situations of liability coverage.2 44 Citing Bartlett v. Na-
accident. Ronald Tomlinson sued Skolnik. His wife, Nancy Tomlinson, who was
not in the accident, joined in the suit with a claim for loss of consortium. Buckeye
settled with Ronald Tomlinson, paying him $25,000. Buckeye alleged this amount
to be the limit of liability under its policy. Nancy Tomlinson's loss of consortium
claim was reserved.
Nancy Tomlinson filed a declaratory judgment action seeking an additional
$25,000 over the $25,000 paid to her husband. Nancy Tomlinson alleged that her
loss of consortium claim was a separate claim under the policy. The parties agreed
that if Nancy Tomlinson's claim was recognized as a separate claim under the
policy, she would be entitled to the $25,000. Thus, the issue was whether a claim
for loss of consortium constituted a separate claim for bodily injury within the
liability coverage of the Buckeye policy. The Ohio Supreme Court held that Nancy
Tomlinson's claim for loss of consortium was not a separate claim for bodily injury
and that Buckeye's policy limiting recovery for all causes of action arising out of
bodily injury to one person to a single limit of liability is a valid restriction of
automobile liability insurance.
The Ohio Supreme Court, relying on Dues, 36 Ohio St. 3d 47, 521 N.E.2d 789
(1988), reasoned that a loss of consortium claim derives from the spouse's claim
for bodily injury. The loss of consortium claim is a derivative action; the spouse's
claim for bodily injury is the primary action. Nancy Tomlinson's action would
not exist but for her husband's action for bodily injury. No law in Ohio forbids
an insurer to restrict derivative actions to a single person limit of liability.
Tomlinson is distinguishable from Wood. Tomlinson did not concern wrongful
death. It concerned a derivative action. And, as stated previously, Ohio does not
prevent an insurer from restricted claims deriving from another's bodily injury.
Therefore, an insurance policy limiting recovery for all causes of action arising
out of or because of bodily injury to one person to a single limit of liability is a
valid restriction of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. The derivative
claimant is left to find coverage under the terms of the tortfeasor's policy.
31 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 44 Ohio St. 3d 163, 166, 541 N.E.2d 1050,
1053, reh'g granted, 45 Ohio St. 3d 602, 544 N.E.2d 274 (1989).
239 Id.
2 Id. at 165-66, 541 N.E.2d at 1053-54.
241 Id. at 166, 541 N.E.2d at 1053.
242 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 44 Ohio St. 3d 163, 167, 541 N.E.2d 1050,
1054, reh'g granted, 45 Ohio St. 3d 602, 544 N.E.2d 274 (1989).
-
4 Id.
- Id. at 167-68, 541 N.E.2d at 1054-55.
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tionwide Mutual Insurance Co.,245 Justice Douglas stated the purpose of
uninsured motorist coverage is to put the injured insured in the same
position he would have been in had the tortfeasor possessed liability
insurance.246 The Justice continued:
The logic of the holding in Bartlett is distorted by today's hold-
ing, however, because an injured person can assert more claims
against her own uninsured and underinsured coverage, pur-
suant to Wood, supra, than she can against the tortfeasor's
liability coverage. In short, today's holding reaches the absurd
result of an injured party being better off when struck by an
uninsured tortfeasor than by a person with liability insur-
ance.
247
Furthermore, noted Justice Douglas, Ohio courts will be burdened by
numerous suits being filed against an injured insured's underinsured
motorist coverage.2 48 "'[W]hen ... the actual amount payable to an in-
jured party under the tortfeasor's policy is less than the insured's policy
limits, the tortfeasor is an underinsured.' ",249 As a result, an injured
insured who is denied the payment of a wrongful death claim by the
tortfeasor's liability insurer will file an underinsured claim with his own
insurer.250 The insured, of course, will be entitled to payment under
Wood.251
The second case decided by the Ohio Supreme Court addressing the
scope of Wood was Burris v. Grange Mutual Cos.2 52 In Burris, Annette
Pollack negligently collided her car into a truck driven by Sanford Burris,
Sr.253 Burris was the sole occupant of the truck.25 4 As a result of the
collision, Burris died.255 Burris was survived by his son, Sanford Burris,
Jr., who was appointed administrator of the estate.2 56 Burris was also
survived by his mother, Ada Burris, and eight adult siblings. 25 7 Pollack
was insured by Grange Mutual Casualty Company.25 The Grange policy
provided coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence.25 9
Sanford Burris, Jr., negotiated with Grange to settle the wrongful death
245 33 Ohio St. 2d 50, 294 N.E.2d 665 (1973).
-1 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 44 Ohio St. 3d 163, 168, 541 N.E.2d 1050,




-0 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 44 Ohio St. 3d 163, 168, 541 N.E.2d 1050,
1055, reh'g granted, 45 Ohio St. 3d 602, 544 N.E.2d 274 (1989).
?51 Id.
252 46 Ohio St. 3d 84, 545 N.E.2d 83 (1989).
253 Id. at 85, 545 N.E.2d at 85.
- Id.
255 Id.





25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
claim that he could maintain against Pollack.28° A tentative settlement
of $90,000 was reached and filed with the probate court.26 1
Ada Burris objected to the proposed settlement and moved to have
Sanford Burris, Jr., removed as administrator.2 62 Ada Burris also filed
suit in the common pleas court seeking a declaratory judgement on
whether the $100,000 or $300,000 policy limit applied to all claims against
Pollack.26 1 Sanford Burris, Jr., moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment
action.2 6 Eventually, the common pleas court dismissed the declaratory
judgement action and, at the same time, the probate court authorized
Sanford Burris, Jr., to settle the wrongful death claim for $90,000.265 Ada
Burris appealed, but the court of appeals held that only $100,000 of
coverage was available.266
On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, Ada Burris argued that the
court should extend Wood to situations involving the tortfeasor's liability
policy.267 Ada Burris argued that each beneficiary under the wrongful
death statute has a claim that cannot be made subject to the single person
limit of liability in Pollack's automobile liability insurance policy.26 Ada
Burris therefore argued that the $300,000 per occurrence limitation ap-
plied, not the $100,000 each person limitation.2 69 To hold otherwise, ac-
cording to Ada Burris, would create an anomaly, in that the per person
limitation would be invalid regarding UUM coverage but valid under a
general liability policy.270
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed and distinguished Wood.271 The
supreme court recognized that Wood rests on the uninsured and under-
insured motorist statute which forbids an insurer to limit UUM coverage
to single person limitations. 272 Ada Burris could not point to any statute
precluding single person limitations in the general liability insurance
policy of a tortfeasor.273 The court, moreover, reasoned that there was no
privity of contract between Ada Burris, the tort claimant, and Grange,
the insurer of the tortfeasor. 274 Conversely, in Wood, all tort claimants
were insured under the same policy.' 75 Ada Burris was left to find coverage
under the terms of the Grange policy.
6 Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., 46 Ohio St. 3d 84, 85, 545 N.E.2d 83, 85 (1989).
261 Id.
262 Id. at 85-86, 545 N.E.2d at 85.
2- Id. at 86, 545 N.E.2d at 85-86.





-7 Id. at 87-88, 545 N.E.2d at 87-88.




271 Id. at 88-89, 545 N.E.2d at 88.
27 Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., 46 Ohio St. 3d 84, 88-89, 545 N.E.2d 83, 88
(1989).
273 Id. at 88, 545 N.E.2d at 87-88.
-
4 Id. at 88, 545 N.E.2d at 88.275 Id.
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In Burris, Justice Sweeney dissented. 276 Justice Sweeney would extend
Wood to situations in which a wrongful death beneficiary attempts to
recover under the liability insurance coverage of a tortfeasor.277 And of
course, the beneficiary does not have to be an insured under the tortfea-
sor's liability policy. According to Justice Sweeney, because the wrongful
death statute creates separate claims, an insurer cannot limit the number
of claims that may be pursued by wrongful death beneficiaries.
278
On April 25, 1990, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Hill v. Allstate
Insurance Co. 2 79 There the court held that "[u]nless otherwise provided
by an insurer, underinsured motorist liability insurance coverage is not
available to an insured where the limits of liability contained in the
insured's policy are identical to the limits of liability set forth in the
tortfeasor's liability insurance coverage. '2 0 Simply put, the effect of Hill
is that the beneficiaries of the deceased insured will be in a superior
position if the tortfeasor carries no liability insurance. Hill flies in the
face of Wood. Justice Resnick, dissenting in Hill, does a fabulous job of
pointing out the confusion in the majority's reasoning:
Consider the following example: Six people are involved in
a one-car accident caused by the driver's (tortfeasor's) negli-
gence. Furthermore, assume the tortfeasor and all five passen-
gers died in the accident, and that the tortfeasor's policy
provided the same limits as in this case - $50,000/$100,000.
The estates of the five passengers would then each assert claims
against the tortfeasor's insurance company. Most likely, the
tortfeasor's insurance company will pay the per accident limit
and hypothetically, award each decedent's estate $20,000. If
each decedent's individual insurance limits are identical to the
tortfeasor's insurance limits, under the majority's holding the
decedents would not be considered underinsured since their
policy limits are identical to the tortfeasor's policy limits. Thus,
they all would be better off if the tortfeasor has no liability
insurance at the time of the accident. The inequity of the ma-
jority's holding is obvious.
Furthermore, assume that three of the decedents carried un-
derinsured motorist coverage with limits of $100,000 per per-
son and $300,000 per accident, while two of the decedents
carried insurance limits identical to the tortfeasor's ($50,000!
$ 100,000). The decedents' estates with the higher policy limits
could, consistent with Wood, supra, each potentially recover up
to the $300,000 per accident limit. However, the estates of the
276 Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., 46 Ohio St. 3d 84, 95, 545 N.E.2d 83, 93 (1989)
(Sweeney, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 95, 545 N.E.2d at 93-94.
278 Id.
279 50 Ohio St. 3d 243, 553 N.E.2d 658 (1990).
210 Id. at 243, 553 N.E.2d at 659.
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two decedents with policy limits identical to the tortfeasor's
limits would each be limited by the majority's decision today
to the recovery of only $20,000 from the tortfeasor's insurance
company, a difference of $280,000!281
Despite the confusion, however, one thing seemed clear: If Hill was to
stay, then Wood was to go.
But on July 3, 1990, it looked as if Wood was to stay and Hill as well
as Burris was to go. At this time, the Ohio Supreme Court decided its
most confusing case, Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Phillips (Phillips Il).282
The supreme court, through Justice Sweeney, reconsidered its earlier
decision in Phillips I and reversed. 283 The court held that each person
entitled to recover damages for wrongful death has a separate claim and
such separate claims may not be made subject to the single person limit
of liability in a tortfeasor's policy.2 4 Thus, the court extended Wood to
situations of liability coverage. The court in Phillips II stated it makes
no sense to reach the absurd result that an injured party is better off
when struck by an uninsured motorist than by a motorist who possesses
liability insurance.285 The majority cited neither Hill nor Burris.
To complicate matters, Justice Brown, concurring in the judgment in
Phillips II, conceded that the majority attempted to overrule Hill but he
noted that Hill was not overruled because the attempt lacked the agree-
ment of four justices.286 Justice Holmes dissented and reminded the ma-
jority that Burris stated an overriding principle." 'An automobile liability
insurance provision that limits coverage for all damages arising out of
bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person to a single limit
of liability is a valid restriction.' "287 Then, out of the blue, Justice Wright
declared that Hill had overruled Wood and that the only real significance
of Phillips 11 was that it reaffirmed Hill's overruling Wood.2s8
Consequently, the bench and bar of Ohio have been left in a state of
vast confusion. Many questions are unanswered: What is the status of
Hill? Is Hill distinguishable from Phillips 11 because Hill concerned UDM
coverage? What is the status of Burris? Is Burris distinguishable from
Phillips Ii? What is the future of Dues? Will the Supreme Court forbid
insurance companies to limit recovery for all causes of action arising out
of bodily injury to one person to a single limit of liability?
The unclear reasoning in Wood and its progeny impairs the effective-
ness of the insurance industry. The industry will find it impossible to
outline the scope and effect of these decisions. And by outlining the scope
and effect of important decisions, the insurance industry can draft policies
correctly, treat insureds properly, and maintain the industry consistently.
11Id. at 249 n.8, 553 N.E.2d at 664 n.8 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
282 52 Ohio St. 3d 162, 556 N.E.2d 1150 (1990).
2
- Id. at 163, 556 N.E.2d at 1151.284 Id. at 166, 556 N.E.2d at 1154.
2Id. at 165, 556 N.E.2d at 1153.
286 Id. at 166, 556 N.E.2d at 1154 (Brown, J., concurring in judgment).
U7 Id. at 167, 556 N.E.2d at - (Holmes, J., dissenting, citing Burris v. Grange
Mut. Cos., 46 Ohio St. 3d 84, 545 N.E.2d 83 (1989)).
m Id. at 167, 556 N.E.2d at 1155 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
The insurance industry has deplored the confusion and uncertainty
that have followed in the wake of Wood v. Shepard.8 9 The analysis of the
Ohio Supreme Court in Wood, to be sure, rests on shaky ground. The
Montgomery County Court of Appeals stated: "We ... reject the notion
that Gina Wood's death somehow gave rise to independent causes of action
for wrongful death .... To our thinking, such a position is fundamentally
irreconcilable with the basic nature of a wrongful death action."
2 90 But
perhaps more important, Wood may be irreconcilable with the basic na-
ture of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. That the Ohio
Supreme Court may have overlooked serious consequences resulting from
its decision in Wood can provide little comfort to the policyholders, in-
surance industry, and legal community of Ohio. Indeed, the full effect of
Wood remains to be seen. The Ohio Supreme Court has left many difficult
questions unanswered and each new case raises yet more questions. In
the end, however, it may well be that everyone - the bench, the bar, and
the litigants - pays for the uncertainty generated by Wood in the form
of increased litigation and convoluted decisions.
- 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 526 N.E.2d 1089 (1988).
29 Wood v. Professionals Ins. Co., unreported, No. 9891 (Ct. App. 1986).
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